Identifying voters

Existing laws enable counterfeit votes in four ways:

  1. Enrolling to vote without proper identification
  2. Voting without proper identification
  3. Voting more than once in an election – ‘Multiple voting’
  4. Boomerang voting / relocation voting / electorate shopping  

 

1. Enrolling to vote without proper identification

Enrolment forms make enrolling too easy for fraudsters.

The AEC enrolment form invites  – but does not demand – proper verifiable printable identification for enrolment.  It’s far too easy for imposters to enrol to vote as anyone they like as often as they wish.  Against this, any AEC language such as ‘voters are required…’ has no legal effect.

 

 

2. Voting without proper identification

No official identification is required of voters at a polling location to prove their right to receive voting papers at that polling location. The three verbal questions required by law about name, address and having voting in the election are not an adequate test of a person's actual identity.

 

3. Voting more than once in an election - 'Multiple voting'

Every Australian of voting age deserves their vote at the ballot box. Some Australians seem to think they deserve two or more votes… even 15 votes. But multiple-voting is too easy to get away with - there is little protection in place to prevent the same person from voting again at another polling place for the same election. The 2010 Federal election was won by less than the number of people who admitted voting more than once.

 

4. Boomerang voting  / relocation voting / electorate shopping  

People can temporarily enrol too easily in other electorates when elections are called.

Picture this scenario:

  1. ‘Sally’ lives in South Australia where she is enrolled.
  2. Her friend is a candidate in a marginal seat in Queensland.
  3. A federal election is about to be called and Sally wants to support her friend.
  4. She goes to the AEC website and changes her address to her friend’s Queensland electorate just before the election.
  5. Sally lodges an absentee vote as a voter living in Queensland.
  6. After the election, she goes back to the AEC website and changes her enrolment back to the South Australian electorate where she lives.
  7. Her friend wins the seat by less than 12 votes.

What can we do to fix this?

  • Electoral commissions must demand a higher standard of proof from people who claim to have moved to another electorate after an election has been called. 
  • Enrolment forms must provide proof of habitation when identifying an address on voter enrolment forms (The AEC forms requires no such proof.  A signed ‘Declaration’ statement is too easy to fabricate and is virtually meaningless unless details are checked.
  • Electoral commissions must tighten enrolment guidelines to prevent people from electorate-squatting.
  • If Australians want fair elections, then elections need better rules to stop people from voting more than once, voting as other electors and voting in multiple electorates during an election.

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  • commented on A fair voting system 2021-08-23 20:54:27 +1000
    Troy Arnould: In answer to your question: it is secret voting. However, one of the safeguards against electoral fraud protocols I proposed could allow a person to choose to reveal their vote but only by choosing to have a receipt printed and then admitting that the receipt in their possession was their own vote receipt. But nothing on the receipt identifies the voter: it only identifies the place of voting and a unique random number that does not even identify the time of voting. That’s all now detailed in the url link spelled out in words in my previous comment, but I updated security recommendations some weeks ago.

    Also, since my original comment, I have better understood and explored the theory behind what began as an empirical approach that worked – but I wasn’t sure why. All I knew was that it was wrong to be obsessed with 1st preferences when sometimes last preferences were more important. Now I have changed the name from APR to DCAP. Candidate Acceptance Percentage is, in FACT, the exact Percentage of voters who Accepted the Candidate as being in the top 50% of Acceptable Candidates.

    Further, I was surprised to prove that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is wrong, and that my DCAP counting method guarantees to give a fair result in all cases. DCAP gives the same results as the Borda count of a FULL preferential voting election, but DCAP expresses the result in a consistent user-friendly way.

    In addition, DCAP easily and fairly handles PARTIAL Preferential Voting as well as SPLIT-Partial preferential voting. SPLIT Partial preferential voting makes it far easier for voters faced with, e.g., 123 candidates from 31 Parties to choose from to elect 6 Federal Senators for NSW. Currently, voting 1-6 for your top 6 Parties risks having zero say over who wins Senator 5 or 6 and hence who may hold the balance of power. But voting 1 to 31 Parties in order of preference is very difficult, let alone preferencing 123 Candidates. in order of preference. To overcome this, a SPLIT vote allows voters to vote (e.g.) 1-7 for their favourite Parties and 25 to 31 for their least favourite parties without having to preference the many micro parties they know nothing about. DCAP allows split votes to be counted fairly, and even to automatically correct voting errors where a voter’s intention is clear.

    DCAP is totally immune to strategic voting: even if a voter voted 1-7 and 93 to 99 for 31 parties, DCAP algorithms automatically translate 93 to 99, to 25 to 31. So, voters collectively get what they voted for, with no strategies available to distort a vote. However, no vote is ever immune from Party, Media or Government misinformation and propaganda.

    Borda is often criticised (by Arrow theory, and by numerical example) as being capable of ignoring an absolute majority. The same applies to DCAP and to its previous guises as: APR (Average Preference Rating); WPC (Weighted Preference Counting); or, CPV (Consensus Preference Voting). Until recently, I conceded that an absolute majority should override WPC/APR/Etc.
    I was wrong.
    Borda/WPC/APR/DCAP override very narrow absolute majorities ONLY, repeat O N L Y when that is in fact the BEST result. This can only happen when the ‘winner’ has a minuscule absolute majority margin compared while that ‘winner’ more strongly deserving the ‘wooden spoon’ as the MOST DISLIKED candidate on preferences.

    Other ‘counting’ methods suffer from erratic tipping points and that’s why they can and do get it wrong – often when it matters most in determining the last one or two candidates elected in multiple representative electorates where such winners often hold the balance of power. In contrast, Borda and DCAP are totally ‘linear’: i.e., they have no sudden tipping points, where changing one vote can tip preferences towards a totally different candidate. This is because Borda and DCAP never eliminate candidates, never distribute preferences, they fairly take into account all preferences for all candidates, in filling all vacancies and every vote has the same say over every vacancy.

    Current eliminate & distribute ‘counting’ methods are inherently flawed: they can not guarantee fair results; plus they facilitate strategic voting trying to game the system.
    Further, some claim that partial preferential voting (but not SPLIT partial preferential voting) skews the system in favour of larger parties. In contrast, DCAP actually guarantees a “fair voting system”.

    Why the D in DCAP?
    DCAP results can seem extremely counter-intuitive. E.g.: With 4 candidates, DCAP will correctly declare candidate D, with ZERO first preferences but 100% 2nd preferences, as the CLEAR STRONG DCAP winner with a DCAP score of 66.67% despite: Candidate A getting an ‘absolute majority’ with 51% of first preferences, but with a DCAP of only 51% due to A’s getting the largest share, 49%, of 4th-or-last preferences; and Candidate B getting 25% of both 1st and last preferences; and, C receiving 24% of first preferences.

    Although absolutely correct, this DCAP result is counter-intuitive and contrary to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Hence the ‘D’ in DCAP to acknowledge that my D’Nalwen Certainty Theorem and DCAP guarantees a fair election counting method, and disproves Arrow’s so-called “Impossibility Theorem”, D’Nalwen being my surname in reverse. Full details are in the url link in my previous comment.

  • commented on A fair voting system 2021-08-23 09:50:39 +1000
    Does it allow for secret voting or are all votes associated to a user and searchable/traceable?

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  • followed A fair voting system 2021-06-15 10:17:44 +1000